We examine how liquidation values and cash flows affect the credibility of financial contract renegotiation and its outcomes. While the 'incomplete contracting' theory of financial contracting predicts that liquidation values determine the allocation of bargaining power between creditors and debtors, there is little empirical evidence on financial contract renegotiations and the role asset values play in such bargaining. This paper attempts to fill this gap. We develop an incomplete-contracting model of financial contract renegotiation and estimate it using data on the airline industry in the United States. We find that airlines successfully renegotiate their lease obligations downwards when their financial position is sufficiently poor and when the liquidation value of their fleet is low. Our results show that strategic renegotiation is common in the airline industry. Moreover, the results emphasize the importance of the incomplete contracting perspective to real world financial contract renegotiation.
Introduction
The control rights that financial contracts provide over firms' underlying assets play a fundamental role in the incomplete contracting literature. In particular, the defining characteristic of debt contracts -which are of predominant importance in raising capital worldwide -is the fact that they provide creditors the right to possess assets when firms default on promised payments (see e.g. Aghion and Bolton (1992) , Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) , Hart and Moore (1994) , Hart and Moore (1998), and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) ). The threat of asset liquidation then provides incentives to debtors to avoid default. Thus, in the incomplete contracting literature, asset liquidation values play a key role in the ex-post determination of debt payments. When liquidation values are low, debtors bargaining position improves vis-à-vis creditors, and all else equal, debt payments tend to decrease.
However, while previous research has analyzed some of the implications of the incomplete contracts approach for financial contracting, 1 there is little empirical evidence analyzing the essence of this incomplete contracts literature -the ability of firms to renegotiate their financial liabilities and the role asset values play in such renegotiations. This paper attempts to fill this gap. We develop a simple incomplete-contracts renegotiation model, and document empirically the conditions under which airlines renegotiate aircraft leases in the United States. Our goal is to understand the factors that enable airlines to extract concessions in renegotiation by holding up their lessors, and to estimate the magnitude of the concessions that airlines obtain. We find that publicly traded airlines often renegotiate their lease contracts. Furthermore, aircraft lease renegotiations take place when both liquidation values and cash flows are low as predicted by our theoretical model. Aircraft leases are a natural environment for testing renegotiations-based models. While the incomplete contracts literature focuses on debt contracts and assumes that creditors have the right to seize an asset if the debtor fails to make a promised payment, the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code protects debtors from collection activities that include foreclosures and repossessions. In contrast, in bankruptcy lessors are relieved from the automatic stay provision that affects most other creditors and thus have the ability to take possession of their assets if a firm defaults on its lease payments. Section 1110 of the bankruptcy code allows an aircraft lessor to seize its assets if 60 days after the Chapter 11 filing the lessee has not cured all defaults. 2 We begin our analysis by developing a simple theoretical model of contract renegotiation based on Hart and Moore (1994) . To determine the credibility of firms' threat to renegotiate pre-existing financial contracts, we follow Bergman and Callen (1991) in explicitly modeling the renegotiation process between the firm and its liability holders. Our model has two testable implications. First, firms will be able to renegotiate their financial commitments only when their financial situation is sufficiently poor. Intuitively, when firms are doing well and future prospects are good, their threat to default on payments will not be credible -defaulting involves a transfer of assets to creditors, and since the assets are necessary for ongoing firm activity, this would involve a large opportunity cost in foregone value. The second testable implication of the model is that when a firm's financial position is sufficiently poor -so that it can credibly renegotiate its financial commitments -a reduction in the liquidation value of the assets increases the concessions that the firm obtains in renegotiation. Thus, the positive relation between liquidation values and post-renegotiation firm payments to creditors predicted in Hart and Moore (1994, 1998) should be concentrated during times when firms are doing poorly.
As motivational evidence, we begin by providing a short case study which describes American Airlines's renegotiation of lease contracts subsequent to its acquisition of TWA in January of 2001. We show that American substantially reduced lease payments on aircraft previously owned by TWA, and estimate the present value of the cost reductions due to lease renegotiation at 48 percent. Anecdotal evidence suggests that American could successfully renegotiate the lease payments because of TWA's dire financial position and because of American's credible threat to reject TWA's leases and return the aircraft to lessors. This would result in a massive glut in the aircraft market which would naturally harm lessors in their search to find new operators for the returned aircraft.
Our empirical analysis examines renegotiation of leases amongst U.S. airlines. We collect data on all publicly traded, passenger-carriers and construct a dataset which includes information about expected and actual lease payments, and fleet composition by aircraft type. In addition, we construct four different measures of the ease of overall redeployability of an airline's leased aircraft.
For example, according to one measure, an airline's fleet is more redeployable if there is a larger number of airlines which operate aircraft of similar type to the aircraft in the airline's fleet. Fleet 2 See for example Jacob (2003) , Pulvino (1998) , and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) . redeployability serves as a proxy for the value of the outside option that lessors have when a lessee fails to make a promised payment, and hence as a proxy for liquidation values.
We further show that endogeneity concerns, in which fleet redeployability is correlated with airline profitability and growth opportunities, are not supported by the data -we find no relationship between airline characteristics and fleet redeployability. Furthermore, we examine the link between redeployability and lease renegotiations within airlines, where airline fixed effects difference out unobservable airline characteristics that may in turn affect fleet redeployability. Moreover, we identify the main theoretical prediction of our model using interaction terms between airline financial position and fleet redeployability, and thus test whether fleet redeployability affects contract renegotiation holding the airline financial position fixed.
The results from the empirical analysis are consistent with our model. Since the model predicts that firms will be able to credibly renegotiate their lease payments only when their financial situation is comparatively poor, we focus on years in which an airline has a negative cash flow.
We then examine how negative cash flow combined with the redeployability of the fleet affect lease renegotiation. As the model predicts, lease payments are reduced during periods of negative cash flows. Our regression analysis suggest that during years of negative cash flow the average ratio of an airline's actual lease payment to its previous years minimum expected lease payment is reduced by approximately 12 percentage points as compared to years when cash flow is positive, after controlling for changes in fleet size and its composition.
The results further show that, as predicted by our model, the ability to reduce payments due to low liquidation values is concentrated during periods of poor financial performance, when airlines' credibility to renegotiate is relatively high. This effect is also sizeable. For example, during periods of negative cash flow, a one standard deviation decrease in the number-of-operators redeployability measure decreases an airline's lease payment by 12.1 percent as compared to its minimum expected lease payment. Our evidence is thus supportive of the ability of firms' to strategically renegotiate their obligations during periods of negative cash flow, insofar as firm payments are reduced when lessors' outside options deteriorate. In contrast, during periods of positive cash flow, when airlines' renegotiation credibility is relatively low, fleet redeployability is either unrelated or slightly negatively related to lease payments, depending on the specification.
We proceed by studying airline bankruptcies. We use years in which an airline is in bankruptcy as a proxy for periods in which airlines can most easily credibly renegotiate their lease payments. Consistent with our previous results, during bankruptcy, airlines appear to succeed in reducing lease payments. For example, while the average ratio of the actual lease payments to expected minimum lease payments is 1.05, bankrupt firms exhibit a ratio of only 0.71, indicating a 32.4 percent reduction in actual lease payments as compared to promised minimum lease payments.
Regression analysis confirms this result. Furthermore, as the model suggests, the ability of airlines to lower their lease payments when their fleets are less redeployable is particularly strong in those years in which firms are in bankruptcy. For example, during periods of bankruptcy, a one standard deviation decrease in the number-of-operators redeployability measure decreases an airline's lease payment by 29.8 percent as compared to its minimum expected lease payment.
We supplement our analysis by studying lease renegotiation out of bankruptcy. We find that, out of bankruptcy, airlines with negative cash flow can reduce their lease payments by between 8 and 13 percentage points by renegotiating their leases. Moreover, as before, lower fleet redeployability enables these airlines to extract greater concessions from their lessors. Our analysis is robust to different definitions of our dependent variable that reflect only large concessions made by lessors.
Furthermore, we use the attacks of 9/11 as an exogenous shock to airlines' cash flows and fleet liquidation values and find that contractual lease obligations were reduced by a magnitude that is between 17.8 and 19.5 percentage points.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I analyzes a simple financial contractrenegotiation model. A case study that analyzes the acquisition of TWA by American Airlines in 2001 is presented in section II. Section III provides a description of our data sources and summary statistics. Section IV describes the empirical analysis. Section V provides robustness analysis and section VI concludes.
I. The Model
In this section, we develop a simple model of financial contract renegotiation based on Hart and Moore (1994) . Our main goals are to analyze the conditions under which a firm can credibly commit to renegotiate its liabilities with outside claimholders, and to analyze the payoffs to parties conditional on renegotiation occuring. We generate two intuitive predictions which are then tested in the data. In order to assess the credibility of renegotiation, we follow Bergman and Callen (1991) in explicitly modeling the renegotiation process between the firm and its liability holders. Our model is also related to Baird and Picker (1991) who study bargaining between a secured creditor and a debtor in bankruptcy, and Bebchuck and Chang (1992) who study bargaining between a debtor and an equityholder in bankruptcy. Similarly, Eraslan (2006) develops and structurally estimates a multilateral Chapter 11 bargaining game.
In describing the model, we refer to the liabilities of the firm as leases. This is solely for consistency with the empirical analysis. The model is equally applicable to other forms of liabilities -such as debt or asset-backed receivables -where firms owe contractually specified payments to a claimholder, who upon breach of contract has the right to repossess collateral. Lessor receives {l1,l2}
A. The Project Timeline and Assumptions
Lessor receives {p1,p2}
Renegotiation Subgame
B. Setup
Consider a firm (The "Lessee") which has entered a contract to lease an asset for 2 periods from a
Lessor. The contract stipulates that the Lessee will pay the Lessor l 1 at the end of period 1, and l 2 at the end of period 2. The Lessee will be using the asset to generate cash flow C 1 in period 1, and C 2 in period 2. These cash flows are not expropriable by the firm -an assumption which approximates the situation faced by large publicly traded firms in the U.S. 3 At the end of period 1, the market value of the asset if liquidated is L, while at the end of period 2, this value collapses to zero. We assume that L < C 2 , so that liquidation at t = 1 is inefficient. 4
The evolution of the game is as follows. At date 1.5 after having obtained C 1 , the Lessee decides whether to abide by the contract and pay l 1 at the end of period 1 and l 2 in period 2, or instead to trigger renegotiation of the lease contract. To understand the credibility of the threat to renegotiate, we explicitly model the renegotiation process between the Lessor and the Lessee as a bargaining game in which the two parties engage in a series of alternating offers as in Rubinstein (1982) .
Between each successive round of offers, the value of the second period cash flow declines by an infinitesimal amount. Bargaining is therefore costly for the firm. This cost can be thought of as arising from the lack of optimal management during the bargaining period, or more broadly, as costs similar to those arising in financial distress. At any point during the bargaining process, if either party accepts an offer of its counterpart, bargaining ends and a new contract is signed with the agreed upon repayment schedule. Alternatively, if renegotiation is unsuccessful in that the second period cash flow has dwindled down to zero while neither party has agreed to an offer of its counterpart, a solution, to be described below, is imposed by a court. At the cost of additional complexity we could assume that the firm leases multiple assets from numerous lessors so that similar to Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) , renegotiation would then take the form of multi-party bargaining. Since the main focus of our paper is empirical, we do not go down this route.
Although cash flows cannot be expropriated, under certain conditions the Lessee will still be able to successfully renegotiate lease contracts and pay less than the original stipulated obligation. This is because of the fact that in our setting contracts are incomplete in that, first, they cannot ban renegotiation, and second, they cannot ban managerial actions which during renegotiation lead to efficiency loss. 5 Thus, the lessee can credibly threaten to destroy future cash flow during the 3 As in most models of debt renegotiation we have implicitly assumed that the asset was financed through the use of a fixed obligation such as a lease or a debt contract instead of through the use of equity. This choice can be thought of as resulting from a variety of agency costs associated with equity.
4 To focus on ex-post renegotiation, we take l1 and l2 to be exogenous, and do not model the ex-ante contracting decision in which lease payments are determined. At the cost of additional complexity, these lease payments can be modeled as stemming from a date-0 contracting choice in which the firm commits to lease an asset which will subsequently generate stochastic cash flow. As will be shown, renegotiation will ensue in those subgames when the realizations of cash flow will be small compared to liquidation values and the ex-ante determined levels of l1 and l2. 5 The assumption that the existence of renegotiation is not verifiable is common in the incomplete contracting literature (for a discussion see Chapter 4 of Hart 1995) . renegotiation process, and thereby deprive both parties of future benefits. It is this threat which allows the Lessee to extract benefits during renegotiation.
For simplicity we assume that the court imposed solution attempts to provide full restitution to the Lessor.
6 According to this: (i) The Lessor repossesses the asset and can therefore sell it for L, and, in addition (ii) the court orders the Lessee to pay the Lessor damages D = min{C 1 , l 1 +l 2 −L}. 7
This amount of damages guarantees that the Lessor obtains as payoff either the full promised scheduled payments, or the entire cash balance which the Lessee possesses at date 1 as well as the value L of the assets.
Finally, we allow the Lessee to cover period 1 lease obligations by raising capital against period 2 cash flow. In doing so, we assume that any incremental securities issued during period 1 are junior to pre-existing obligations. Also, for simplicity, we assume that the Lessee cannot pay out a dividend until all lease obligations are fulfilled. Our main results are robust to these two assumptions, although both can be seen as standard covenants arising endogenously in an optimal contract between the Lessor and the Lessee. As an alternate setting, we could follow Hart and Moore (1994) and assume that the firm's CEO has human capital which is crucial for the project, and can thus extract rents from lessors by threatening to leave the firm. Renegotiation payoffs would then be determined by Nash bargaining.
The advantage of explicitly modeling the renegotiation process as an alternating offer game is that it allows us to determine the credibility of the renegotiation threat using the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium solution, thereby justifying the Nash bargaining payoffs.
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C. Contract Renegotiation, Liquidation Values and Cash Flows
In this section we solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game to analyze the conditions for contract renegotiation and the payoffs obtained therein. Using backward induction, we begin by solving for the SPE of the subgame beginning after the Lessee has decided to trigger 6 The law allows a lessor to sue a lessee for damages upon breach of contract. While full restitution is not guaranteed, our results are robust to other forms of court awarded damages. For an introduction to Leasing law, see Whaley (2005) . 7 In the event that the liquidation value, L, is greater than l1 + l2, damages are assumed to be zero. This case, however, is not interesting, as it is clear that it will involve no renegotiation.
8 Essentially, both provisions serve to increase the Lessee's pledgeable income. In a more complex model which includes agency costs such as a managerial private benefit from continuation, these covenants may no longer be optimal (For an example, see Hart and Moore (1994) ).
9 Appendix A of Hart and Moore (1994) presents a model in which, while parties disagree on the division of surplus, cash flows to the firm equal zero, and shows that the SPE of the game approximates the Nash bargaining outcome in continuous time.
renegotiation. In doing so, we need only consider the case when C 1 + L < l 1 + l 2 . When this inequality does not hold, the lessee clearly never triggers renegotiation since the lessor can obtain full repayment through the court imposed solution. As would be expected, because the game is one of complete information, Lemma 1 states that in the subgame perfect equilibrium the two parties immediately reach agreement. Also, since the outside option of the Lessor is increasing in L, if renegotiation occurs, the Lessor is worse off and the Lessee is better off when L decreases.
Having calculated the payoffs from renegotiation, Proposition 1 identifies when the Lessee will choose to trigger renegotiation rather than abide by the initial lease payment schedule. Proof. If the lessee is in financial distress in that (C 1 + C 2 ) < (l 1 + l 2 ), he will obviously choose to renegotiate and obtain a strictly positive payoff rather than abide by the original contract and obtain a payoff of zero. In contrast, when the Lessee is not in financial distress, he will trigger renegotiation when his payoff from doing so,
, is greater than his payoff from abiding by the contract (C 1 + C 2 ) − (l 1 − l 2 ). This can be rearranged to yield Equation 1. If renegotiation does not occur and C 1 < l 1 , the only way to pay l 1 at t=1 is by raising additional capital against t=2 cash flow. This is feasible, however, since case (b) has C 1 + C 2 > l 1 + l 2 .
The intuition behind inequality (1) in Proposition 1 is that the Lessee can credibly renegotiate the initial contract when C 1 , C 2 and L are sufficiently small compared to the contractually specified payment l 1 + l 2 . First, all else equal, when L or C 1 are small, the Lessee's effective bargaining position is high, since the Lessor's outside option -to sell the repossessed asset for L and seize the period one cash flow C 1 -is not very attractive. The Lessee can thus credibly commit to trigger renegotiation, knowing that by doing so, the Lessor will accept a more favorable payment schedule. Similarly, the Lessee can credibly commit to renegotiate the lease contract only if C 2 is sufficiently low. This is because the Lessee's ability to obtain concessions from the Lessor stems from the Lessee's willingness to accept the destruction of the firm's future earnings prospects during renegotiation, and in so doing, harm the firm's ability to repay the Lessor. However, if C 2 is too high, the Lessee's threat to accept future cash flow destruction is not credible, since in order to harm the firm's ability to repay the Lessor, the Lessee would need to destroy a large fraction of the firm's future earnings prospects. The Lessee would thus prefer instead to simply pay the prespecified lease payments. 10 Figure 1 displays the Lessee's renegotiation choice in (C 1 , C 2 ) space. In area A, the firm is in financial distress (C 1 + C 2 < l 1 + l 2 ), and hence, as stated in Proposition 1, can easily credibly renegotiate lease payments to obtain a positive payoff. In area B of Figure 1 the firm is not in financial distress and condition (1) holds. Thus, because C 1 , C 2 and L are small enough compared to the initially specified contract payment, l 1 +l 2 , the Lessee can credibly renegotiate a new, reduced payment schedule. 11 Intuitively, although the firm is not in financial distress, its financial position is poor enough to allow the Lessee to credibly renegotiate lease payments. Finally, in area C, prespecified lease payments are relatively small compared to both the liquidation value, L, and current and future firm cash flows. Thus, in this area the Lessee cannot credibly trigger renegotiation, and instead, abides by the originally signed contract. Both predictions are a direct result of Proposition 1. First, when C 1 and C 2 are relatively high, condition (1) will not hold and so the firm will not be able to credibly threaten to renegotiate its contracted lease payments. Put differently, as Prediction 1 states, firms will be able to renegotiate financial contracts only when their financial condition is sufficiently poor. Prediction 2 states that firms will be able to renegotiate and lower their lease payments when the liquidation value of their assets, L, decreases, but that this effect will be concentrated in times when firms' financial position is relatively poor because only then can firms credibly renegotiate their payments. Figure 2 provides an illustration of this effect, plotting the sum of the firm's realized lease payments as a function of its liquidation value for different values of C 1 + C 2 . When C 1 + C 2 is sufficiently high -formally, when C 1 + 0.5 * C 2 > l 1 + 0.5 * l 2 -the firm can never credibly renegotiate its lease contract, and so realized lease payments are independent of L. As the financial position of the firm deteriorates (C 1 and C 2 decrease), the region in which the firm can credibly renegotiate increases, as does the region in which lease payments decrease with reductions in L.
II. The Acquisition of Trans World Airlines by American Airlines: A Case Study
In this section, we briefly describe the acquisition of Trans World Airlines (TWA) by American Airlines (AA) in January 2001, and the lease renegotiation process that subsequently ensued. We argue that AA had the ability to credibly threaten to reject many of TWA's leases, and that the outcome of the lease renegotiation in this case is consistent with the model presented in Section I.
A. TWA's Financial Difficulties and American Airlines Purchase Plan
On January 10, 2001 TWA filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition as part of a deal with AA. Under the deal, AA acquired almost all of TWA's assets by paying $625 million in cash and assuming obligations of TWA that exceeded $5 billion. The acquisition marked the end of more than a decade of financial difficulties for TWA which included two previous Chapter 11 reorganizations.
AA purchased substantially all of TWA assets subject to section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code which authorizes the sale of property of a debtor's estate under certain conditions. Baird and
Rasmussen (2003) find that asset sales subject to section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code account for 56% of the large businesses that completed their Chapter 11 proceedings in 2002. According to Baird and Rasmussen (2002) : "Many use Chapter 11 merely to sell their assets and divide up the proceeds. TWA filed only to consummate the sale of its planes and landings gates to American Airlines".
AA acquired a total of 173 aircraft from TWA, in addition to a new hub in St. Louis, key gates, maintenance facilities, and a 26% stake in the Worldspan computer-reservations system.
According to AGIFORS (2001), 12 one of the primary benefits of the TWA acquisition was the complementarity between the fleets of the two airlines -a fact confirmed by the large overlap in aircraft type operated by AA and TWA (see Table 1 ).
B. American Airlines's Threat to Reject TWA Leases.
Although AA assumed most of TWA's obligations, it was not obligated by law to assume all lease contracts. According to Section 365 of the bankruptcy code, AA had the ability to reject TWA's aircraft leases 13 resulting in the leased aircraft being returned to the lessors and leaving the lessors with an action for damages. Furthermore, upon rejection, lessor's claim for damages would be against TWA cash flow. Consistent with prediction 1 of the model, since TWA had not generated positive earnings for more than a decade, and by January 3, "TWA was down to its last $20 million in cash" (Carey 2001 ), AA's ability to threat to reject the aircraft leases were deemed to be quite credible. Indeed, according to Buhler (2003) : Moreover, since TWA's fleet was quite large, rejecting TWA's leases could have flooded the aircraft market, thus forcing lessors to sell their repossessed aircraft at 'fire sale' prices. Table 2 
C. Estimates of the Value of Lease Renegotiation
Eventually most of the DC-9s were rejected and the leases of the MD-80s, Boeing 757s, and Boeing 767s, were renegotiated. AGIFORS (2001) estimates that as a consequence of renegotiation, AA reduced the expected cost of TWA's aircraft leases from $5 billion to approximately $2.8 billion.
Indeed, according to Buhler (2003) : We continue by estimating the value of the renegotiations to AA. We obtain data on current and expected lease payments from the 10Ks of AA and TWA. Since airlines are required to report their future lease obligations as specified by pre-existing lease contracts, we can compare the expected lease expenses before the acquisition of TWA to the actual cost of the leases after the acquisition was completed. We begin by estimating the expected lease obligations of TWA as of 12/31/1999. Using TWA's debt yields for different maturities as reported in TWA's 10K to discount TWA's future lease commitments (between 11.8% and 14.7%), we calculate the present value of TWA's future lease commitments to be $3,877 million (see Panel A of Table 3 ). Since AA assumed leases on 78% of TWA's seat capacity, absent renegotiation, we would expect the present value of AA's lease expenses to increase by 0.78 × 3, 877 = $3, 027 million. This was not the case. Table 3 Our estimate is consistent with Buhler's (2003) anecdotal evidence and suggests that, as our model predicts, AA was able to accept a favorable payment schedule given its credible threat to reject the leases due to TWA's low cash flow and the threat to flood the market with aircraft. The next sections provide a formal empirical analysis of these effects in the U.S. airline industry.
Panel B of
III. Data and Summary Statistics
This section describes the data sources used in our empirical analysis and outlines summary statistics for both airline characteristics and measures of fleet redeployability.
A. Airline Characteristics
To construct our sample, we collect data from a number of sources. We start with all publicly traded firms with a four-digit SIC code equal to 4512 (Scheduled Air Transportation) during the 15 AA dismissed about 3% of its seats capacity during 2001. 16 It should be noted that the difference between the lease expenses of AA and TWA are not driven by the superior credit quality of AA since risk-adjusted discount rates are used in the present value calculations.
period 1990-2005. We then search for all annual reports of each of these firms as recorded in the online SEC-Edgar database. From each annual report, we collect the following information.
First, from the Properties section of the annual report, we construct an account of the composition of each airline's leased fleet. Thus, we record the number of aircraft which are leased by each airline by aircraft type. Second, from the income statement, we record the amount paid by each airline in the form of aircraft lease expenses.
17 Third, from each annual report, we collect information on future contracted lease payments owed by airlines. According to FAS regulation 13, a firm must report in the 'Notes to Financial Statements' section its pre-existing lease commitments for each of the five years following the filing of an annual report. In addition, the firm must report the sum of future scheduled lease commitments from year six and on. We therefore collect for each The maximum number of leased aircraft in our sample is 483 (Continental Airlines in 2005). The average airline profitability (operating income before depreciation divided by the book value of assets) is 9.13%.
To measure the degree of lease contract concessions obtained by airlines, we construct three variables related to lease payments. Our first, and main, measure is the ratio of actual lease payments paid during year t to the minimum expected year t lease payment as of year t − 1 (Actual/Expected −1 ). As described above, the denominator of this ratio is taken from the airlines'
10K statements. Table 4 shows that the mean ratio of actual to minimum expected lease payment in the full sample is 1.05. On average, lease payments are greater than the previous year's minimum expected lease payment, indicating increased payments due to fleet growth. Our second measure is simply the rate of change of lease payments from year t − 1 to year t. Table 4 shows that this average rate is 9.1%. The final measure we use to measure possible renegotiation of lease payments is simply the annual lease payments divided by the book value of assets.
We also define a dummy variable, Low Cash F low, that equals one for airlines with negative cash flow from operations (income before extraordinary items + depreciation and amortization), and zero otherwise, as a measure of financial difficulties. There are 44 airline-year observations with negative cash flow, representing 20.7% of our sample. Table 4 reports summary statistics for cash flow divided by the book value of assets for airlines with negative earnings (Low Cash F low = 1).
B. Redeployability Measures
Due to economies of scale in fleet operation, airlines tend to limit the number of aircraft types which they operate in order to reduce costs associated with pilot training, maintenance, and spare parts.
We take advantage of this fact in developing our measures of redeployability by assuming that the potential secondary market buyers of any given type of aircraft are likely to be airlines already operating the same type of aircraft. According to Pulvino (1998) , the market for used commercial aircraft is 'extremely thin', with approximately 20 used commercial aircraft transactions per month worldwide. Likewise, Gavazza (2006) Our approach to measuring redeployability is motivated by the industry equilibrium model of Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , and is similar to the empirical approach developed in Benmelech (2006) for 19th century American railroads, and to Gavazza (2006) for U.S. aircraft. Benmelech (2006) exploits the diversity of track gauges in 19th century American railroads to identify potential buyers for railroad tracks and rolling stock. Gavazza (2006) uses the number of aircraft per type and the number of operators per type to proxy for asset liquidity.
B.1 Proxies for Aircraft Redeployability
We use the Ascend CASE database which contains ownership and operating information about all commercial aircraft worldwide to construct our measures of airline fleet redeployability. We begin by constructing three redeployability measures at the yearly level for each aircraft type, where aircraft type is defined using the broad-type category in the Ascend CASE database. To do so, we compute for every sample-year 1) the number of aircraft per type; 2) the number of operators per type, and 3) the number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type. In calculating these three redeployability measures, we disregard airlines who are in bankruptcy (as defined in the SDC bankruptcy database), since their financial position most likely precludes them from serving as potential aircraft buyers. This process yields three redeployability measures for each aircraft-type and each sample-year.
To construct the redeployability measures for an entire fleet of an airline, we aggregate the aircraft-type redeployability measures across all leased aircraft in each airline's fleet. Specifically, we define the redeployability of an airline's leased fleet to be the weighted average of the redeployability index corresponding to each of the leased aircraft in the airline's fleet. We calculate in this manner three measures of fleet redeployability corresponding to each of the three measures of aircraft-type redeployability. The three measures are given by:
where i represents an airline fleet, t represents a sample year, a denotes an aircraft type, and ω i,t,a is defined as
Since we do not have data on aircraft market values, we use the number of seats in an aircraft model as a proxy for its size (and value) in our weighted average calculations. Furthermore, in calculating the first redeployability measure, since we want to account for the residual demand for the aircraft in each fleet, we do not include each airline's own aircraft. Likewise, in our number-of-operators based proxies we do not count the airline for which we calculate the measure.
The TWA case suggests that the fleets of large airlines are less sellable. Using the Ascend CASE database we therefore construct a fourth measure of redeployability as the ratio between the number of leased aircraft per type that an airline has and the total number of aircraft per type. As before, to construct the fourth proxy at the airline-fleet level, we calculate the weighted average of the redeployability index corresponding to each of the leased aircraft in the airline's fleet: Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the redeployability proxies. As can be seen, the redeployability measure based on aircraft number has an average value of 1,217.2 with a median of 972.9. There are on average 152.7 potential buyers for an airline's leased aircraft but only 49.9 when operators with more than 5 aircraft of the same type are considered (the median number is 41.8). Finally, on average, an airline in our sample operates 7.57% of the world's fleet of an aircraft type, with a median of 4.4%. 
IV. Empirical Analysis
In this section we analyze empirically the ability of airlines to renegotiate their contractual lease obligations. Our goal is to understand the factors that enable airlines to extract concessions in renegotiation by holding up their lessors, and to estimate the magnitude of the concessions that airlines obtain.
19 It should be noted that when the fleet-share redeployability measure is high, the fleet is less redeployable
A. Redeployability and Endogeneity
One concern in using our redeployability measures as proxies for the strength of airlines' bargaining positions vis-à-vis their lessors is that the redeployability of an airline's aircraft is endogenous and driven by growth opportunities or profitability. According to this explanation, airlines with more redeployable aircraft are more (or less) profitable and can renegotiate their contractual lease obligations more efficiently.
While we control in our regressions for airline characteristics, and our identification strategy is based on within-airlines estimates using airlines fixed-effects, the endogeneity of the redeployability measures is ultimately an empirical question. In Table 7 we test the hypothesis that fleet redeployability is correlated with airline characteristics. We regress each of our four redeployability measures on airline characteristics: sales, profitability, fleet size, the fraction of wide-bodied aircraft leased by the airline, and a dummy variable that equals 1 for airlines in bankruptcy and zero otherwise. All regressions include year and airline fixed-effects and standard errors are clustered by airline. As can be seen, we find that sales is statistically significant in one out of four specifications, while none of the rest of the explanatory variables are statistically significant in explaining aircraft redeployability. 20 We do not include the market-to-book ratio as an explanatory variable in the regressions in Table 7 since several airlines do not have publicly traded equity.
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The fact that our redeployability measures are not correlated with airline characteristics such as profitability, bankruptcy, and market-to-book measures, alleviates concerns about the endogeneity of our redeployability measures and their correlation with future growth opportunities and financial performance. Furthermore, in our subsequent regression analysis we include airline characteristics and airline fixed-effects to control for airline heterogeneity that potentially drives aircraft redeployability.
B. Cash Flow, Lease Renegotiation and Aircraft Redeployability
Our model predicts that firms can credibly renegotiate scheduled payments only when their financial condition is relatively poor. We use years in which airlines have negative cash flow as a proxy for periods in which their threat to renegotiate lease payments is credible (Low Cash F low = 1). While 20 To alleviate a multicollinearity concern, we also include each of the regressors individually for each of the redeployability measures and find similar results (not reported).
21 In unreported regressions we included market-to-book for the sub-sample of airlines with data on equity prices and found no relation between market-to-book and the redeployability measures.
renegotiation itself is unobservable, we test the model's prediction by estimating the outcomes of contract renegotiation. To do so, we use the ratio of an airline's actual lease payments to its minimum expected lease payments calculated as of the previous year (Actual/Expected −1 ) as our main dependent variable.
Since the ratio of an airline's actual lease payments to its previous year's minimum expected lease payments may increase (decrease) mechanically when airlines expand (reduce) their leased fleet size, we control in our regression analysis for the change in an airline's fleet, as well as the size of the airline's leased fleet, the size of the airline's leased fleet squared, and the composition of the fleet as captured by the fraction of wide-bodied aircraft in the fleet. 22 We hypothesize that after controlling for fleet change, fleet composition, fleet size and higher order terms, changes in (Actual/Expected −1 ) should be driven by contract renegotiation. To confirm this hypothesis, we conduct keyword searches of the financial reports of the airlines in our sample and find 19 cases in which airlines report that they have renegotiated aircraft leases. We find that the mean ratio of Actual/Expected −1 for airlines that do not report lease renegotiation is 1.07, while that of airlines that do report lease renegotiation in their financial reports is 0.91 (t-statistic for an equal means test=2.38). Furthermore, when we restrict our sample to airlines with Low Cash F low=1, the mean of Actual/Expected −1 is 0.99 for airlines that do not report lease renegotiation, compared to 0.77 for airlines that do report lease renegotiation in their financial reports (t-statistic for an equal means test=2.52). Thus, confirming our Actual/Expected −1 renegotiation measure, airlines that report lease renegotiation pay in lease expenses an amount smaller than their (previous year's) contracted lease payments. Hence, we conclude that after controlling for a battery of fleet covariates that likely soak up changes in lease payments that may be unrelated to renegotiations, changes in our dependent variable capture contract renegotiations.
According to the model, the negative relation between liquidation values and the ability of firms to hold-up their lessors and obtain concessions in renegotiation should be concentrated in those periods when firms can credibly renegotiate their lease payments. Thus, we expect that during periods of relative financial difficulty airlines will be able to reduce their lease expenses when their fleet is less redeployable. We therefore run different specifications of the following baseline regression which includes an interaction term between each of the four measures of fleet redeployability and 22 Our results are also robust to the inclusion of a cubic term of fleet size.
the Low Cash F low dummy variable:
where (Actual/Expected −1 ) it is the ratio of an airline's actual lease expenses to its previous year's minimum expected lease payments, Low Cash F low it is a dummy variable indicating whether airline i has negative cash flow in year t, Redeployability is one of our four measures of the redeployability of an airline's fleet, and Redeployability it × Low Cash F low it is an interaction term between Low Cash F low and each of the four redeployability measures. y t is a vector of year fixed-effects, a i is a vector of airline fixed-effects, and X it is a vector of control variables that include the natural logarithm of the airline's sales, the size of the airline's leased fleet, the size of the airline's leased fleet squared, the percentage change in the size of the airline's fleet, and the percent of wide bodied aircraft in an airline's fleet. The first four columns in Table 8 report the results of Regression 2 for each of our four measures of redeployability, while the last four columns of Table 8 report the results of the regressions which include also airline fixed-effects. All regressions include robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the airline level.
As can be seen from the coefficients on the Low Cash F low variable, negative cash flow is associated with a drop in actual as compared to expected lease payments in three out of the four redeployability measures (the coefficient using the fleet-share redeployability measure is negative but not statistically significant). The coefficients on the first four columns of Table 8 indicate that during years of negative cash flow, the average ratio of an airline's actual lease payment to its previous years minimum expected lease payment is reduced by approximately 12 percentage points as compared to years when cash flow is positive. 23 Thus, consistent with Prediction 1, these results suggest that on average, during periods of negative cash flow, airlines can successfully renegotiate their aircraft leases and lower their actual payments as compared to their pre-contracted payments by an economically significant amount. Including airline fixed-effects does not qualitatively change the results, although the statistical significance is reduced.
Prediction 2 of the model states that airlines with low redeployability fleets should be able to obtain concessions in renegotiation when their financial performance is relatively poor. We test this prediction by employing in the regression analysis a variable capturing fleet redeployability as well as a variable interacting redeployability with the Low Cash F low variable. As can be seen in Table   8 , the coefficients on the non-interacted redeployability measures indicate either a negative relation between fleet redeployability and Actual/Expected −1 or a relation that is not statistically different from zero (when including airline fixed effects or using the fleet-share redeployability measure).
Thus, during years of positive cash flow (Low Cash F low = 0), we find that airlines are not able to obtain concessions from their lessors and reduce their lease payments when the redeployability of their assets is low. 24 However, consistent with Prediction 2 of the model, the results indicate that reduced fleet redeployability is associated with lower lease payments when an airline has negative cash flows.
As the interaction term between redeployability and Low Cash F low indicates, both with and without airline fixed-effects, in years with negative cash flow the relation between redeployability and Actual/Expected −1 is now positive using three of our four measures of redeployability. Put differently, when the threat to renegotiate is more credible -as proxied by Low Cash F low equaling one -reductions in fleet redeployability measures are associated with reductions in actual compared to contracted lease payments. For example, using the airline fixed-effect specification, if an airline has negative cash flow, a one standard deviation decrease in the aircraft redeployability measure decreases an airline's lease payment by 17.2 percentage points as compared to its minimum expected lease payment.
Similarly, a one standard deviation decrease in the operators redeployability measure in an airline with negative cash flow decreases an airline's lease payments by 12.1 percentage points as compared to its minimum expected lease payment. Finally, the effect of a one standard deviation decrease in the large operators redeployability measure decreases the ratio of Actual/Expected −1 by 10.6 percentage points. The coefficient on the interaction between the fourth redeployability measure, fleet-share, and the Low Cash F low dummy variable also implies a positive relation between redeployability and Actual/Expected −1 but is not statistically significant.
For robustness, we repeat our analysis using both lease payments or changes in lease payments as dependent variables and report the results in Table 9 . We estimate the following modified version of Regression 2:
where Lease Expenses/Assets it is the level of lease payments divided by the book value of assets, Low Cash F low is a dummy variable indicating whether an airline has negative cash flow, Redeployability is one of our four measures of the redeployability of an airline's fleet, and
Redeployability it × Low Cash F low it is an interaction term between Low Cash F low and each of the four redeployability measures. y t is a vector of year fixed-effects, a i is a vector of airline fixedeffects, and X it is a vector of control variables that include the natural logarithm of an airline's sales, the size of an airline's leased fleet, the size of an airline's leased fleet squared, the percentage change in the size of an airline's fleet, and the percent of wide bodied aircraft in an airline's fleet.
All regressions include robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the airline level.
The first 4 columns of Table 9 report the results from estimating Regression 3. In this specification, we find that after controlling for airline fixed-effects, there is no statistically significant relation between the level of lease payments and the negative cash flow dummy variable, or the redeployability measures. However, our main result holds: the interaction between redeployability and Low Cash F low is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in three out of four cases.
25 Thus, consistent with Prediction 2, conditional on poor financial performance -as proxied by negative cash flow -reductions in fleet redeployability are associated with reductions in (scaled) lease payments. Indeed, a standard deviation reduction in fleet redeployability reduces the ratio of lease payments to assets by between 2.1 to 3.4 percentage points. The reduced economic significance can be explained by the fact that the dependent variable in Regression 3 -scaled lease payments -does not capture contracted lease payments as does the Actual/Expected −1 variable in Table 8 .
Likewise, in the last four columns of Table 9 we estimate the following regression:
Ln Lease Expenses Lease Expenses
25 Similar to Table 8 , the coefficient on the interaction variable using the fleet-share redeployability measure also indicates a positive relation between fleet redeployability and lease payments conditional on Low Cash F low equaling one, but is not statistically significant.
where Ln
Lease Expenses Lease Expenses −1 it
is the one-year change in lease payments. As above, we control for airline and fleet covariates and year fixed effects. Since in these regressions our dependent variable is a rate of change we do not include airline fixed-effects.
As the last four columns of Table 9 demonstrates, consistent with Prediction 1 and 2, we find a robust negative relation between the Low Cash F low dummy variable and the yearly change in lease payments for three out of the four redeployability measures. Indeed, during years when Low Cash F low equals one, the yearly change in lease payments is reduced by between 8 and 13 percentage points as compared to years when Low Cash F low is zero. Importantly, consistent with Prediction 2, we find that the interaction between redeployability and Low Cash F low is positive and statistically significant for three out of the four redeployability measures so that when airlines are doing poorly, reductions in fleet redeployability are associated with reductions in lease payments. A one standard deviation reduction in the redeployability measures reduces the change in lease payments by between 3.4 and 5 percentage points.
C. Lease Renegotiation in Bankruptcy
We continue our analysis by studying airline bankruptcies. We use years in which an airline is in bankruptcy as a proxy for periods in which airlines can credibly renegotiate their lease payments.
The main difficulty with this analysis is that, although we include all bankruptcies for which we have available data, our sample contains only 11 airline-year observations in which an airline is in bankruptcy.
26 However, due to the natural importance of bankruptcy in the airline industry, and since some of the airlines who file for Chapter 11 protection are the largest in the industry, we devote a subsection for the renegotiation of leases in bankruptcy. Furthermore, we hypothesize that since a lessee's threat to reject its leases and return aircraft to lessors is more credible during bankruptcy as compared to during years of negative cash flow, the effect of redeployability on the ability to obtain concessions from lessors in lease renegotiation will be stronger than that found in the previous section. Table 10 presents the results of running the following regression for each of the four redeploya- 26 We include both bankruptcies of U.S. Airways (2002 Airways ( -2003 Airways ( , and 2004 Airways ( -2005 , and the bankruptcies of ATA, Comair Delta Airlines, Mair, Northwest, and United Airlines. We were not able to obtain data for the second bankruptcy of TWA (1995) , and for the bankruptcies of Hawaiian Airlines and Tower. We do not include the third bankruptcy of TWA since it was acquired by American Airlines. bility measures:
where Bankruptcy is a dummy variable taking on the value of one in those years in which an airline is under the protection of Chapter 11, and zero otherwise. Redeployability is one of our four measures of the redeployability of an airline's fleet, F leet is the size of an airline's fleet, y t is a vector of year fixed-effects, a i is a vector of airlines fixed-effects, and X it is a vector of control variables that include the natural logarithm of an airline's sales, the size of an airline's leased fleet, the size of an airline's leased fleet squared, the percentage change in the size of an airline's fleet, the percent of wide bodied aircraft in an airline's fleet, and airline profitability. All regressions include robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the airline level. The first four columns in Table 10 report the results of Regression 5 for each of our four measures of fleet redeployability, while the last four columns report the results of the same regressions which also include airline fixed-effects.
Our model predicts that when airlines are in Chapter 11 they can credibly renegotiate their lease payments, and that, in doing so, if their fleets are less redeployable they will be able to obtain greater concessions from their lessors. Consistent with this prediction, during bankruptcy, the relation between redeployability and Actual/Expected −1 ' is positive using all four measures of redeployability. Also, as hypothesized, consistent with a more credible threat of lease rejection, the effect of reduced fleet redeployability is stronger in bankruptcy as compared to in periods of negative cash flow. In the specifications without airline fixed-effects, we find that in bankruptcy, a one standard deviation decrease in the fleet redeployability measures decreases an airline's lease payments by between 31 and 56 percentage points as compared to its minimum expected lease payment. In the specifications which include airline fixed-effects, a one standard deviation decrease in fleet redeployability measures decreases an airline's actual as compared to minimum expected lease payments by between 28 percentage points (operator-5 redeployability measure) and 79 percentage points (number-of-aircraft redeployability measure). 27 Finally, in Table 10 we also include the interaction between fleet size and the Bankruptcy variable to capture the possibility that airlines with large fleets can extract concessions by threatening their lessors with massive liquidation as in the case of TWA's acquisition. We find some qualified support for this hypothesis in that the coefficient on this interaction variable is negative in all eight specifications, although it is statistically significant in only five of them.
D. Lease Renegotiation out of Bankruptcy
We now test whether our results are driven solely by the ability of firms to renegotiate and obtain concessions when they are in bankruptcy. To this end, we repeat the analysis in Regression 3 while including only those airline-years in which airlines are outside of bankruptcy. As before, we include year and airline fixed-effects and calculate robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the airline level in all of the regressions. The results are presented in the first four columns of Table 11 .
As can be seen in the table, the results continue to hold when focusing only on airlines out of bankruptcy: First, as in Table 8 , the Low Cash F low dummy variable is negatively related to Actual/Expected −1 in three of the four redeployability measures. Second, and more importantly, conditional on an airline having negative cash flow, there is a positive relation between redeployability and the amount of actual compared to expected lease payments in three of the four redeployability measures. Thus, we find that, even outside of bankruptcy, airlines can renegotiate with their lessors and cut their lease rates when their fleets are less redeployable and their financial condition is sufficiently poor.
As would be expected, since we are not including bankruptcy airline-years, in which our results are particularly strong, the economic magnitudes implied in the first four columns of Table 11 are lower than those found in Table 8 . Calculated at mean levels of redeployability, airlines outside of bankruptcy with negative cash flow can reduce their actual compared to minimum expected lease payments by between 8 and 13 percentage points as compared to those with positive cash flow. Second, conditional on having negative cash flow, a one standard deviation reduction in redeployability is associated with an approximately 8 percentage point reduction in actual lease payments as compared to minimum expected lease payments.
V. Robustness Tests
In this section we provide two robustness tests to our main analysis. In the first robustness check we refine our dependent variable to reflect only large concessions made by lessors. Our second robustness test uses the attacks of 9/11 as an exogenous shock to airlines' cash flows and fleets' liquidation values and studies the implication of these shocks to leases renegotiations.
A. Large Concessions
As a first robustness test, we proxy for renegotiation using a dummy variable which takes on a value of zero when the ratio of actual to previous year's expected lease payments, Actual/Expected −1 , is less than one, and takes on the value of one otherwise. As such, a zero value of the dummy variable represents cases in which airlines paid an amount smaller than their minimum contracted lease payment. 28 We repeat the analysis in Regression 2 using this dummy variable proxy for renegotiation as a dependent variable and a probit specification with year fixed-effects and standard errors that are clustered by airline.
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The last four columns of Table 11 present the probit specification results and report the marginal effect of an incremental change in each independent variable calculated at its mean level. 30 As can be seen, our results are unchanged: Consistent with Prediction 1, in three of the four specifications airlines with negative cash flow are more likely to obtain concessions, as evidenced by a higher probability of having a ratio of Actual/Expected −1 which is less than one. Consistent with Prediction 2, conditional on having negative cash flow, reductions in three of the four redeployability measures are associated with a greater likelihood that an airline's lease payments are smaller than its minimum contracted lease payments; The coefficients indicate that a standard deviation reduction in the redeployability measures increases the likelihood of lease renegotiation by between 5.5 and 8.6 percent. The coefficients indicate that a standard deviation reduction in the redeployability measures increases the likelihood of lease renegotiation by between 28 In unreported results, we repeat this exercise with a 0.9 cutoff threshold for Actual/Expected−1 and obtain similar results.
29 We do not include airline fixed-effects in the probit specification given the incidental parameters problem a fixed-effects probit introduces (Wooldridge 2002) .
30 For the Low Cash F low dummy variable, we report the effect of a discrete change from 0 to 1.
B. 9/11 and Lease Renegotiations
As a final robustness test we document the effect of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on airline lease renegotiation. The 9/11 attacks shook the American airline industry drastically. According to the U.S. Department of Transportation (2005) 
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We examine the implications of the 9/11 attacks for lease renegotiations. The attacks were an exogenous shock to the airline industry that affected both airlines cash flows and liquidation values.
Since we cannot separate the effects of the exogenous 9/11 shock on liquidation values and cash flows, we repeat the analysis in Regression 2 using (Actual/Expected −1 ) as our dependent variable and include a dummy variable that equals to one for the years 2001-2005 (Post 9/11), and zero otherwise. Our regressions include also airline and year fixed-effects, and robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the airline level. As Table 12 demonstrates, all our results hold after controlling for the Post 9/11 dummy. Furthermore, the coefficients on the Post 9/11 dummy variable suggest that contractual lease obligations were reduced by a magnitude that is between 17.8 and 19.5 percentage points (t-stats between -2.11 and -2.46). Thus, the exogenous shock of the 9/11 attacks that affected both cash flows and liquidation values had a large impact on lease contract renegotiations.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we analyze theoretically and empirically firms' ability to renegotiate financial obligations from an incomplete contracting perspective. We provide a simple model showing that firms will be able to credibly renegotiate for better terms only when their financial position is relatively poor, that firms' ability to reduce their pre-specified commitments will increase when the liquidation values of their assets decrease, but, importantly, that this effect will be concentrated in those times when renegotiation is credible. We proceed by analyzing lease renegotiation in a sample of publicly traded, U.S. airlines. Our empirical results indicate that, consistent with the model, airlines in relatively poor financial position are able to renegotiate and reduce their lease payments with lessors. Furthermore, using measures of fleet redeployability as a proxy for the liquidation value lessors would obtain upon the default of an aircraft lease, we show that when airlines are in poor financial condition, lower fleet redeployability increases their ability to reduce lease payments.
Our evidence supports the incomplete contracting literature in that the ability of firms to renegotiate their financial commitments depends heavily on their bargaining position vis-à-vis liability holders. This bargaining position is determined, in turn, by both the credibility of threats made during renegotiation and by the outside option of the bargaining parties.
VII. Appendix -Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We prove the lemma by backward induction. First, suppose that the value of the second period cash flow has deteriorated to a level below L. In this case, the only offer that the Lessor will accept is one in which the Lessee liquidates the firm and pays out all proceeds, along with C 1 , to the Lessor, for a total payment of C 1 + L. This is because of the fact that the Lessor can guarantee C 1 + L by refusing all offers and waiting for the court imposed solution, while the Lessee cannot offer more than this amount due to the deterioration of the second period cash flow. 32
By backward induction, to solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium we can consider a revised game in which the subgame following the point in which second period cash flow equals L is replaced with a terminal node having a payoff of C 1 + L to the Lessor and a payoff of zero to the Lessee.
Consider, therefore, the game in which after a rejection by either party, period 2 cash flow is reduced by (1/N ) * (C 2 − L) (with N large) so that after N rejected offers, period 2 cash flow equals L and parties receive their terminal payoffs of C 1 + L and zero. Assume that, without loss of generality, the Lessor makes the final offer prior to second period cash flow deteriorating to L and that N is even. Finally, for convenience, we number the N rounds of alternating offers in reverse order with round N referring to the round in which the first offer is made, and round N referring to the round in which the last offer is made, i.e. prior to second period cash flow deteriorating to L. Because the Lessee is not allowed to pay dividends until all lease obligations are fulfilled, we can analyze repayment schedules (p 1 , p 2 ) based on their sum (p 1 + p 2 ). It should also be noted that since cash flows obtained by the firm are not expropriable, at t = 2 the Lessee will never be able to renegotiate lease payments.
In the last round of the alternating offer process (round 1), second period cash flow equals
, which leaves zero for the Lessee. It is optimal because the Lessee is indifferent between accepting this offer and refusing it, since if he refuses, cash flow will deteriorate to L and he will obtain a terminal payoff of zero anyway. Without loss of generality we assume that the Lessee accepts the offer. In round 2, in which it is the Lessee's turn to make an offer, second period cash flow equals L + (2/N ) * (C 2 − L). In order to induce the lessor to accept a round 2 offer, the lessee must offer the lessor a payment schedule (p 1 , p 2 ) with
Since C1 + L is assumed to be less than l1 + l2, the lessee obtains C1 + L under the court imposed solution.
is what the Lessor can guarantee by refusing the round 2 offer and proceeding to round 1. The
for himself, and the Lessor accepts. The backward induction solution continues to unravel in a similar manner; in round i, the party making the offer -be it Lessor or Lessee -offers to his counterpart the amount that the counterpart will obtain in round i − 1 and keeps the remaining surplus to himself. Since in each round no rents are left on the table, every period the offerer will increase his payoff by
(1/N ) * (C 2 − L), while the offeree will see no change in his payoff as compared to the previous round. By induction, therefore, at every even numbered round i, the subgame perfect equilibria has the Lessee offering the Lessor a repayment schedule of 
Top-ten Operators of MD-80s
Top-ten Operators of DC-9s This table provides descriptive statistics of airline characteristics. Lease expenses are total aircraft lease expenses (in $ million), Lease Expenses/Assets are total aircraft lease expenses divided by the book value of the assets, Actual/Expected −1 Lease Payments is the ratio of an airline's actual lease expenses to its previous year's minimum expected lease payments, ln(Lease Expenses/Lease Expenses −1 ) is the yearly change in lease payments, Leased-fleet size is the number of aircraft leased by the airline, Wide-body is the fraction of wide-bodied aircraft leased by the airline, Profitability is operating income before depreciation divided by the book value of assets, Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items + depreciation and amortization divided by assets, Low Cash F low is a dummy variable that equals one for airlines with negative cash flow from operations, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in the regressions is the ratio of an airline's actual lease expenses to its previous year's minimum expected lease payments -Actual/Expected −1 . Sales is the logarithm of annual airline sales. Fleet is the number of aircraft leased by an airline, Fleet squared is the square of the number of aircraft leased by an airline, Fleet change is the annual change in fleet size. Wide body share is the fraction of wide-bodied aircraft leased by an airline. Low Cash F low is a dummy variable that equals one for airlines with negative cash flow from operations, and zero otherwise. Redeployability (aircraft) is the number of aircraft per type; Redeployability (operators) is the number of operators per type, Redeployability (≥ 5 aircraft) is the number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type. Redeployability (fleet-share) is the ratio between the number of leased aircraft per type that an airline has and the total number of aircraft per type. Regressions also include interactions between each of the Redeployability measures and Low Cash F low. All regressions include an intercept (not reported) and year fixed-effects. t-statistics are calculated using standard-errors that are clustered by airline and reported in parenthesis.
Dependent Variable=
Actual The dependent variable in the regressions is either the ratio of lease payments to the book value of assets (columns 1-4), or the yearly change in lease payments -Change -(columns 5-8). Sales is the logarithm of annual airline sales. Fleet is the number of aircraft leased by an airline, Fleet squared is the square of the number of aircraft leased by an airline, Fleet change is the annual change in fleet size. Wide body share is the fraction of wide-bodied aircraft leased by an airline. Low Cash F low is a dummy variable that equals one for airlines with negative cash flow from operations, and zero otherwise. Redeployability (aircraft) is the number of aircraft per type; Redeployability (operators) is the number of operators per type, Redeployability (≥ 5 aircraft) is the number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type. Redeployability (fleet-share) is the ratio between the number of leased aircraft per type that an airline has and the total number of aircraft per type. Regressions also include interactions between each of the Redeployability measures and Low Cash F low. All regressions include an intercept (not reported) and year fixed-effects. t-statistics are calculated using standard-errors that are clustered by airline and reported in parenthesis.
Leases The dependent variable in the regressions is the ratio of an airline's actual lease expenses to its previous year's minimum expected lease payments -Actual/Expected −1 . Sales is the logarithm of annual airline sales. Fleet is the number of aircraft leased by an airline, Fleet squared is the square of the number of aircraft leased by an airline, Fleet change is the annual change in fleet size. Wide body share is the fraction of wide-bodied aircraft leased by an airline. Profitability is operating income before depreciation divided by the book value of assets. Bankruptcy is a dummy variable taking on the value of one in those years in which an airline is under the protection of Chapter 11, and zero otherwise. Redeployability (aircraft) is the number of aircraft per type; Redeployability (operators) is the number of operators per type, Redeployability (≥ 5 aircraft) is the number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type. Redeployability (fleet-share) is the ratio between the number of leased aircraft per type that an airline has and the total number of aircraft per type. Regressions also include interactions between Fleet and Bankruptcy, and between each of the Redeployability measures and Bankruptcy. All regressions include an intercept (not reported) and year fixed-effects. t-statistics are calculated using standard-errors that are clustered by airline and reported in parenthesis.
Actual 
Out of Bankruptcy Renegotiation and Large Concessions
The dependent variable in the regressions is either the ratio of an airline's actual lease expenses to its previous year's minimum expected lease payments -Actual/Expected −1 (columns 1-4), or a dummy variable taking on a value of one when Actual/Expected −1 is greater than one -(columns 5-8). Fleet is the number of aircraft leased by the airline, Fleet squared is the square of the number of aircraft leased by an airline, Fleet change is the annual change in fleet size. Wide body share is the fraction of wide-bodied aircraft leased by the airline. Low Cash F low is a dummy variable that equals one for airlines with negative cash flow from operations, and zero otherwise. Redeployability (aircraft) is the number of aircraft per type; Redeployability (operators) is the number of operators per type, Redeployability (≥ 5 aircraft) is the number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type. Redeployability (fleet-share) is the ratio between the number of leased aircraft per type that an airline has and the total number of aircraft per type. Regressions also include interactions between each of the Redeployability measures and Low Cash F low. All regressions include an intercept (not reported) and year fixed-effects. t-statistics (z-statistics for the probit regressions) are calculated using standard-errors that are clustered by airline and reported in parenthesis. The Table also reports R 2 ((b) Pseudo R 2 ), and the number of observations. (a) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
Dependent Variable=
Actual The dependent variable in the regressions is the ratio of an airline's actual lease expenses to its previous year's minimum expected lease payments -Actual/Expected −1 . Sales is the logarithm of annual airline sales. Fleet is the number of aircraft leased by an airline, Fleet squared is the square of the number of aircraft leased by an airline, Fleet change is the annual change in fleet size. Wide body share is the fraction of wide-bodied aircraft leased by an airline. Post 9/11 is a dummy variable taking on the value of one for each year following and including year 2000 and zero otherwise. Low Cash F low is a dummy variable that equals one for airlines with negative cash flow from operations, and zero otherwise. Redeployability (aircraft) is the number of aircraft per type; Redeployability (operators) is the number of operators per type, Redeployability (≥ 5 aircraft) is the number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type. Redeployability (fleet-share) is the ratio between the number of leased aircraft per type that an airline has and the total number of aircraft per type. Regressions also include interactions between each of the Redeployability measures and Low Cash F low. All regressions include an intercept (not reported) and year fixed-effects. t-statistics are calculated using standard-errors that are clustered by airline and reported in parenthesis.
